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Access to the Media
Columbia Broadcasting: Public Access to the
Media Denied
In Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee' the
Supreme Court attempted to resolve the conflict between public access to
the media and journalistic freedom in the field of electronic communication.
This conflict emerged during the mid-1960's as groups of citizens sought
to combat the presentation of views by an increasingly centralized press
with a novel constitutional theory. In contrast to the traditional negative
theory, based on the first amendment's prohibition of laws which abridge
freedom of speech, the proponents of access urged a positive approach.
Since the established media no longer provided an adequate outlet for dis-
sonant minority views, the public needed access, a right of entry into the
marketplace of ideas. Without this right, the argument concluded, effec-
tive speech was denied. Concededly, acceptance of this view would break
hallowed constitutional traditions and restrict the independence of the media.
Thus, the irony quickly materialized: if a constitutional right of access was
to become a reality, some of the constitutional protections of the newspaper
publisher and the broadcast licensee would have to yield to the public's de-
mand for a more effective forum.
Those who proposed greater media access encountered various judicial
responses to their constitutional claims. The theory gained acceptance in
certain areas, but generally the courts failed to discern the requisite state
action in the editorial decisions of electronic journalists to summon the de-
mands of the first amendment. 2  In line with these lower court decisions,
the majority in Columbia Broadcasting held that a broadcast licensee may
refuse to accept editorial advertisements (advertorials) s without violating
1. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
2. Over two decades ago two lower court decisions refused to grant a right of
access to the air waves because private broadcaster conduct did not adequately involve
the government to require application of the first amendment. The opinions indicated
that each court struggled with the problem of applying restraints to a segment of the
press, and finally refused to do so on the grounds of insufficient governmental involve-
ment. McIntire v. Wm. Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1945); Massa-
chusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rodgers Co., 183 F.2d 497 (1st Cir.
1950); accord, Post v. Payton, 323 F. Supp. 799 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
3. The term "advertorials" first appeared in 85 HARv. L. REv. 689, 692 (1972),
in a casenote discussion of Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.
2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94 (1973), to describe non-commercial advertisements aimed at propagating a view
on a controversial issue.
1973]
Catholic University Law Review
either his statutory duty to serve the public interest or the first amendment.
The Court agreed with the appellants, the Federal Communications Com-
missions (FCC) and major representatives of the industry it regulates, and
rejected the argument urging a constitutional right of access to the air-
waves. It relied instead on the FCC's fairness doctrine as sufficient to pro-
tect first amendment values.
As an alternative to a constitutional right of access, the appellees in
Columbia Broadcasting argued that a statutory foundation for access was
implicit in the public interest standard of the Communications Act. This
argument also faltered, however, as the Court again pointed to the fairness
doctrine as the historical FCC approach to satisfaction of the public interest.
Over the past two decades this doctrine has become an increasingly impor-
tant broadcaster obligation, and now in the wake of the Columbia Broad-
casting opinion, it is inextricably intertwined with access. Consequently,
appreciation of the recent decision requires not only a background in the
development of access, but also an overview of the fairness doctrine.
1. The Fairness Doctrine
The Communications Act of 1934,4 the legislation controlling the federal
government's regulation of the broadcasting industry, mandates that those
who utilize the public airwaves provide full and fair coverage of public is-
sues through the presentation of conflicting views on controversial issues.
This obligation of fairness developed as the need for governmental manage-
ment of the scarce electronic spectrum evolved into a statutory attempt to
force the communications industry into serving the public interest.
Federal regulation was first imposed because the industry's lack of
standards had resulted in a "cacophony of competing voices" clogging the
public airways, "none of which could be clearly or predictably heard." 5
Through the FCC, and its predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission,6
Congress sought to bring order to the electronic media by supervising the
allocation of broadcast frequencies among qualified applicants. 7 In per-
forming this function, the FCC requires that licenses would be granted only
when the public interest, convenience, or necessity would be served. This
rule has been broadly interpreted8 to require each licensee to be responsive
4. 47 U.S.C. §§ 7-744 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Communications Act].
5. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969). See also 60
GEO. L.J. 871, 1032 (1972).
6. The FRC was established by Congress in ch. 4 of the Radio Act of 1927, 44
Stat. 1162, and was transformed into the FCC by the Communications Act.
7. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307, 309 (1971).
8. Because, "[N]o clear expression on congressional intent regarding the fairness
obligations of broadcast licensees exists in the legislative history associated with the
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to the needs of the community it serves. In an early decision, the FCC de-
fined the "public interest" obligation as "[giving] ample play for the free
and fair competition of opposing views . . . [on] all discussions of issues of
importance to the public."9
The FCC assumes wide discretionary authority under the public interest
standard. It has denied licenses'0 and construction permits," banned edi-
torials 2 and promulgated chain broadcasting regulations. 13 The chain broad-
casting orders were challenged by a broadcasting network in National Broad-
casting Company v. United States.' 4  In that case, the Supreme Court up-
held the FCC's authority to use the "expansive"' 5 power found in the Commu-
nications Act to devise remedies to insure that the public interest would be
protected against the national networks' attempt to dominate local radio pro-
gramming. This judicial declaration of the FCC's "comprehensive powers
to promote and realize the vast potentialities of radio"' 6 has become the
touchstone for the development of rules which impose affirmative obligations
on broadcasters to balance program content."7
passage of the [Communications] Act," the FCC has had to interpret the public interest
mandate. Note, Fairness Doctrine: Television as a Marketplace of Ideas, 45 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1222, 1224 (1970).
9. Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 FRC ANN. REP. 32, 39 (1929), quoted in Red
Lion, 395 U.S. at 377.
10. Trinity Methodist Church, South v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
11. Young People's Association for the Propagation of the Gospel, 6 F.C.C. 178
(1938).
12. Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 340 (1940).
13. Report on Chain Broadcasting, FCC Order No. 37, Docket 5060 (May, 1941).
14. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
15. Id. at 219.
16. Id. at 217.
17. The FCC has used the National Broadcasting holding to back up some of its
most controversial rulings. See generally, Note, Regulation of Program Content by
the FCC, 77 HA~v. L. REV. 701 (1964).
Less than four months after the Supreme Court handed down that decision, the FCC
cited its chain broadcasting regulation to support a broad ruling that a licensee may
not, as a general policy, deny all paid time for discussions of controversial issues.
Radio Corporation of America, 10 F.C.C. 212, 213 (1943). It required applicants
for licenses to "refrain from adopting any restrictions which will automatically rule
out certain types of programs." According to some, this proceeding was significant
because "it recognized for the first time an affirmative obligation on the part of the
licensee to broadcast controversial issues." 60 GEo. L.J. 1032, 1035 (1972). Three
years later, in a lengthy 1946 memorandum, familiarly known as the Blue Book, the FCC
promulgated guidelines for adequate programming, Public Service Responsibility of
Broadcast Licensees, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING (Kahn ed.
1968). These guidelines have given way to a formal FCC ruling that broadcasters must
devote certain percentages of their time to specified categories of programs. 20 P
& F RADio REG. 1901 (1960). Most recently, the FCC "prime time access rule" has
limited network-provided programs to three hours a weekday night. 23 F.C.C.2d 382
(1970).
The courts have also used the National Broadcasting holding to justify FCC rules
and regulations. See, e.g., FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953);
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A 1949 FCC report, Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees,' marked
the beginning of an official statutory framework, known as the fairness
doctrine, which imposes the obligation of comprehensive coverage of public
issues on the broadcaster as an integral part of the public interest standard.
The report enumerated the twofold duty of the licensee to devote a reason-
able percentage of time to public issue broadcasting, and to insure that dur-
ing such programming the public had a reasonable opportunity to hear con-
flicting positions on the issues. These limitations on the freedom of the
licensee are accepted as the price necessary to "make possible the mainten-
ance of radio as a medium of free speech."' 9  The report gave the licensee
the right to express its own opinions on the air as long as it made "reasonable
effort(s) to provide a balanced presentation of comment and opinion on
such issues.' '20 Ten years later, Congress accepted the validity of the Edi-
torializing Report balancing requirements by specifically applying the fair-
ness doctrine to the broadcast of editorials for political candidates through
an amendment to Section 315(a) of the Communications Act.2  Congress
provided, however, that this action did not narrow the licensee's duty to
fulfill public interest requirements as interpreted by the FCC. 22  The
FCC has ruled that the presentation of conflicting views on issues of
public importance must be done at the broadcaster's expense if sponsor-
ship were unavailable23 or must be produced by the broadcaster itself if
necessary. 24  In addition to an overall evaluation of the balance of a li-
censee's general new programming at license renewal time, the FCC, in a
public notice reviewing the scope of the fairness doctrine, listed three areas
in which it would apply the doctrine:25 (1) personal attacks,2 0 (2) ex-
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405
F.2d 1082, 1093-94 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
18. 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
19. Id. at 1250.
20. Id. at 1255.
21. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, § 1, 73 Stat. 557, amending 47
U.S.C. § 315(a) (1958) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1971)).
22. 47 U.S.C. 315(a) (1971) reads in part,
Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcast-
ers, in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news
documentaries, and on the spot coverage of news events, from the obligations
imposed upon them under this chapter to operate in the public interest and to
afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on is-
sues of public importance.
23. Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P & F RADio REG. 895 (1963).
24. John J. Dempsey, 6 P & F RADno REG. 615 (1950).
25. 29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (1964).
26. When the controversial view expressed consists of a personal attack on the hon-
esty, character, integrity or like personal qualities of an identified person or group,
the licensee shall offer a reasonable opportunity to respond over the licensee's facili-
ties. 29 Fed. Reg. 10420 (1964) (codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123(a), .300(a), .598
(a), .679(a) (1970)).
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pression of a partisan positions by non-candidates, 2 and (3) presentation
of views on current issues in the context of entertainment programming. 28
Broadcaster dissatisfaction with the fairness doctrine limitations on their
freedom of speech culminated in Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. FCC.29
In Red Lion, a licensee challenged the constitutionality of the fairness doc-
trine and its corollary personal attack rules.3 0 The FCC had required a li-
censee to make reply time available to an author insulted by a fundamen-
talist minister during a radio program. A unanimous Supreme Court3'
held that the regulations comprising the fairness doctrine were within the
scope of statutory authority given to the FCC to regulate broadcasting in
the public interest, 32 and enhanced, rather than abridged, freedom of
speech. 33 The Court reasoned that federal control of the airwaves by li-
censees necessitated treating them as public trustees.34 Such a status al-
lowed the government to require a licensee to share its allotted frequency
with others whose opinions of importance to the community might go unno-
ticed if the licensee had absolute control over the broadcast of all opinions. 35
While the Court could have rested on this statutory justification of the fair-
ness doctrine, the Justices went on to hold that the public's first amendment
right to free and open debate on public issues is paramount to the licensee's
right to broadcast its own views. 36 Significantly, the Court found the fairness
doctrine, an imposition of public obligations on the electronic press, con-
sistent with the intent of the first amendment. According to those who pro-
posed increased public access, Red Lion laid the foundation for a constitu-
tional right of public entry to the media.
H. Access And The First Amendment
The constitutional theory that claimed a first amendment right of access to
the media was first proposed by Professor Jerome Barron in 1967.37 Grad-
27. 29 Fed. Reg. at 10419.
28. Id. at 10418.
29. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
30. 29 Fed. Reg. at 240 (1964).
31. Mr. Justice White wrote the 8-0 opinion in which Justice Douglas did not par-
ticipate.
32. As part of the FCC's powers and duties the Communications Act provides that
the FCC may, "from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires
• . . [m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions
• . . as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [the Act]." 47 U.S.C. §§ 303,
303(r) (1970).
33. 395 U.S. at 379-86.
34. Id. at 394.
35. Id. at 389.
36. The Court stated that "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right
of the broadcasters, which is paramount." 395 U.S. at 390.
37. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
19731
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ually, the theory gained relatively wide acceptance by courts and commen-
tators. 8s According to Barron, an anomaly exists in our constitutional
law which protects the expression of the established media, but is indifferent
to creating opportunities for individual expression. This anomaly allows
the press to use its first amendment rights as a rationale for the repression
of competing ideas.3 9 He blames the situation on the Supreme Court's
"romantic view" that truth will win out only if the free marketplace of ideas
is unhampered by governmental intrusion.40  Believing that the romantic
view is an anachronism in the modern world, Barron would replace it with
an approach that views the problem of access to media in the context of a
technology which can defeat4 ' or dampen 42 the free competition of ideas.
This "contextual" approach would focus on access as an enhancement of
free expression,43 and not simply whether or not such a right would restrain
REV. 1641 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Barron].
38. Within four months of the article's publication Barron was cited approvingly
in Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp. 438, 442 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), and Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968); see notes 55-58 infra, and accompanying text.
To date more than 15 courts have cited his thesis in problems of individual access
to the electronic media.
Some commentators have criticized his article for taking the unprecedented position
that newspapers may be subjected to far-ranging controls; see, e.g., Robinson, The FCC
and the First Amendment, Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Reg-
ulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67, 159 (1967). Most, however, have accepted the basic
validity of his argument when applied to the electronic press. See e.g., Johnson and
Western, A 20th Century Soapbox: The Right to Purchase Radio and Television Time,
57 VA. L. REv. 574 (1971); Horning, The First Amendment Right to a Public Forum,
1969 DUKE L.J. 931; Note, The Listener's Right to Hear in Broadcasting, 22 STAN.
L. REV. 863 (1970).
39. Barron 1641-42.
40. Id. at 1642. Barron believes this "romantic view" was articulated best in Den-
nis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) where Justice Douglas stated that,
When ideas compete in the market for acceptance, full and free discussion
exposes the false and they gain few adherents. Full and free discussion even
of ideas we hate encourages the testing of our own prejudices and preconcep-
tions. Full and free discussion keeps a society from becoming stagnant and
unprepared for the stresses and strains that work to tear all civilizations apart.
41. Id. at 1644. Barron cites statistics showing that the number of American cities
with competing daily newspapers declined from 689 to 87 between 1910 and 1954.
This trend, due in part to the rising costs of producing and distributing a metropolitan
newspaper, has caused papers to either collapse or combine with rivals. He quotes
a commentator who feels the one-paper town allows the monopoly to suppress facts
at its discretion.
42. Marshall McLuhan has observed that the very nature of modem media is at
war with a point of view orientation. The electronic media, he contends, has mesmer-
ized our society into believing the form the message is delivered is its most important
quality and thus television is particularly ill-suited to the problem of making public
issues meaningful. See generally H.M. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA (1964).
43. Barron argues that citizen expression has always been given more protection
than the press' right to freedom of expression which "is not an absolute right, as is
illustrated by Associated Press [v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), holding that
anti-trust laws are applicable to newspapers despite possible affect on speech], and
[Vol. 23:339
Access to the Media
the press. The following judicial decisions, legislative history, and FCC
proceedings represent the foundation from which Barron and later commen-
tators developed the theory of a constitutional right of access.
A. Access to Appropriate Forums
The Supreme Court took up the problem of ensuring suitable access to ap-
propriate forums for the communication of ideas more than thirty years
ago. In Hague v. CIO,44 the Court struck down ordinances which restricted
speech in public parks. When applied, these laws abridged the union's right
to effectively communicate with a relevant audience in an appropriate
forum. More recently, this right to use public forums was expanded 45 to
include such areas as privately owned streets and sidewalks, 46 shopping
malls, 47 public schools, 48 and bus terminals.49  Generally, the Court's de-
cisions of the past decade emphasized the "profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust
and wide-open . . . ."0 Gradually, the constitutional emphasis shifted
from the right to speak, to the right to both speak effectively and to hear the
voices of public debate. 51 This theme was directed to broadcasting by Justice
White in Red Lion: "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
to guarantee access to divergent, otherwise unexpressed ideas would so promote the
societal interests underlying the first amendment as perhaps to outweigh the medium's
claim." Barron 1655.
44. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
45. The expansion of this "appropriate forum" concept progressed in Local 590,
Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Logan Valley], where the Court declared that, having opened his
property for general commercial use by the public, the shopping mall owner could
not ban protest activity related to the policies of one of his tenants. Four years later
Logan Valley was severely limited by Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Lloyd]. In Lloyd the majority affirmed a private property
owner's right to prohibit first amendment activity on his property, but they expressly
refused to overturn the Logan Valley holding that speech closely related to the primary
purpose of the property itself may not be abridged by the owner or the government. 407
U.S. at 563-64. Applying this rationale to the "forum" of the electronic media it could
be strongly argued that the very nature of the media is the business of communicating
information to the public. First amendment activity seeking access to the airwaves
could not, therefore, be denied under the Lloyd principle that such speech was not re-
lated to the primary purpose of the property.
46. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
47. Logan Valley.
48. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
49. Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 940 (1968); see n. 57 infra and accompanying text.
50. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
51. In Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967) the court proclaimed, "Those guaran-
tees [of freedom of the press] are not for the benefit of the press so much as for the
benefit of all of us."
1973]
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right of the broadcasters, which is paramount . . . .It is the right of the
public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other
ideas and experiences which is crucial here. ' 52
During the turbulent 1960's, several federal and state courts utilized the
implications of the Supreme Court's "forum" decisions as a springboard to
grant access to protestors seeking to publicize their dissent. In the first
three cases, Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District,53 Kissinger
v. New York City Transit Authority,5 4 and Hillside Community Church v.
City of Tacoma,5 5 demonstrators tried to purchase bus and subway adver-
tising space that was readily available to commercial advertisers. They were
refused access to the billboard of the vehicles by the municipalitites because
of an advertising policy that allowed only commercial advertising for the
sale of goods and services. In each case the court found that the refusal
sufficiently involved the government, and concluded that once the forum
bad been opened, discrimination based on speech content was constitution-
ally invalid.5"
Two other cases, Wolin v. Port of New York Authority57 and In Re Hoff-
man,65 dealt with the right of protestors to have access to bus and railway
terminals to communicate their opposition to the Vietnam war. Both the
California Supreme Court and the circuit court found that the crowds, con-
fusion and various commercial activities made transportation terminals ap-
propriate public forums. The courts rejected the private owner's contention
that they had simply opened their premises to the public for a "limited and
specific purpose only, namely, for the use of the transportation facilities of-
fered .... -,9
B. Access and Federal Regulation
Despite pronouncements on the right of access to public forums, these cases
cannot be directly analogized to create a similar right of access to the
broadcaster's microphone. Electronic communication is unique, present-
ing an inherent paradox in that although the press has been traditionally
free from government interference, the electronic press must be regulated
to make maximum use of the publically owned airwaves. The paradox
is nowhere more apparent than in the statutory and regulatory attempts to
deal with the question of access.
52. 395 U.S. at 390.
53. 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 982, (1967).
54. 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
55. 76 Wash. 2d 63, 455 P.2d 350 (1969).
56. 274 F. Supp. at 443; 434 P.2d at 990; 455 P.2d at 354.
57. 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
58. 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353 (1967).
59. ld. at 846, 434 P.2d at 354.
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During the congressional debates on both the Radio Act of 1927 and the
Communications Act of 1934, the legislators repeatedly refused to "put the
broadcaster under the hampering control of being a common carrier and
compelled to accept anything and everything that was offered him so long
as the price was paid."' 0 Although Congress sought to preserve the rights
of private journalism for the electronic press,6 1 it did create a limited right
of access for political candidates.6 2
It was not Congress, however, that provided the most important impetus
for the statutory right of access in Columbia Broadcasting. In 1945, the
FCC promulgated a broad rule in a license renewal proceeding, United
Broadcasting Company (WHKC),6 3 which intimated that at least limited
access was a fundamental tenent of the public interest requirement of the
Communications Act. When a union objected to a station's refusal to sell
time, the FCC declared: "[T]he operation of any station under the ex-
treme principles that no time shall be sold for discussion of controversial
60. 67 CONG. REC. 12504 (1926), quoted in Columbia Broadcasting, 412 U.S. at
106.
The public utility status imposed by 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-23 on telegraph and radio
communications was proposed for broadcasting by Congressman Davis. See 67 CONG.
REC. 5483 (1926), and 412 U.S. 94, 105 n.2.
The Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in reporting out the bill that
was to become the Radio Act of 1927 refused to include a provision making broadcast
facilities open on a non-selective basis to everyone seeking to discuss public issues.
See H.R. REP. No. 404, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1926) (minority report).
The House-Senate Conference deleted a portion of the Senate's proposed 1934 Com-
munications Act that would have allowed a limited number of individuals to have per-
sonal access to the licensee facility to oppose any view broadcast concerning a public
issue. See H.R. REP. No. 1918 and S. REP. No. 3285, 73 Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1934)
quoted at 412 U.S. 94, 108 n.4. Congress finally adopted Section 3(h) of the
Communications Act. Section 3 (h) provided as follows:
'Common carrier' or 'carrier' means any person engaged as a common carrier
for hire, in' interstate or foreign communications by wire or radio or in inter-
state or foreign radio transmission of energy, except when reference is made
to common carriers not subject to this chapter: but a person engaged in ra-
dio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a
common carrier.
48 Stat. 1065, as amended 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1971).
61. See, e.g, § 326 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended 47 U.S.C. §
326 (1971), where the intent is displayed by insuring that radio and television will
not be subjected to government censorship.
62. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) provides in part that "If any licensee shall permit any
person who is a legally qualified candidate for public office to use a broadcasting
station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office
in the use of such broadcasting station."
Recently, Congress has broadened the scope of a candidate's right to air time by
commanding that stations "allow reasonable access to or permit purchase of reason-
able amounts of time . . . by a legally qualified candidate for federal, elective office."
See Campaign Communications Reform Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, amending
47 U.S.C. § 312(a).
63. 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945).
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public issues . . . is inconsistent with the concept of the public interest. '6 4
This new FCC policy was seemingly understood and accepted ' by the broad-
casters. It was enforced by the FCC and, prompted by formal petitions for
the denial of license renewals, three warnings66 were issued to licensees
based on the United Broadcasting principle. Four years later, with the
Editorializing Report6 7 which outlined the fairness doctrine, the FCC gave
broadcasters on the one hand the explicit responsibility of fully and fairly
informing the public, and on the other the absolute discretion to decide when,
who, and what would be transmitted. Although not specifically mentioned,
direct public access had been subjugated to private journalistic judgment
until 1971, when the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia promoted
access to a constitutional prerogative in Columbia Broadcasting.
Ill. Columbia Broadcasting: A Right of Access Denied
In 1970, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) sought a declaratory
ruling from the FCC which would forbid a broadcaster from rejecting paid
announcements on public issues as a general policy, or, in the alternative,
that such policy would constitute an adverse consideration for the broadcast-
er's license renewal. The Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace
(BEM) had also raised the same issue with the FCC in a complaint against
a radio station which had refused to air BEM's advertising spots opposing
the Vietnam war. Announcing both decisions on the same day,68 the FCC
ruled that the stations had complied with the fairness doctrine 9 and thereby
satisfied both the public interest requirement of the Communications Act
and the first amendment. Thus, it would not compel the licensees to accept
the offered "advertorials." The Court of Appeals for the District of Col-
64. United Broadcasting Co. (WHKC), 10 F.C.C. 515, 518 (1945). Lewis White,
a historian of American radio, described the United Broadcasting decision in his book
THE AMERICAN RADIO (1942) as "a memorable order which, in effect, threw the
door open to the sale of time for discussion of public issues."
65. Within two months the National Association of Broadcasters had amended its
Code to delete the ban on the sale of time for discussion of controversial issues. See
"NAB Revises Code, Expands Labor Relations," BROADCASTING, Aug. 13, 1945, at 20
quoted in Brief for Respondent DNC at 21 n.23, CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973).
66. Sam Morris, 11 F.C.C. 197 (1946); Robert Harold Scott, 11 F.C.C. 372 (1946);
and Homer P. Rainey, 11 F.C.C. 898 (1947).
67. 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). See notes 18-23 supra and accompanying text.
68. Democratic National Comm., 25 F.C.C.2d 216; Business Executives for Vietnam
Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242 (1970).
69. The fairness doctrine was first fully promulgated in Editorializing by Broad-
cast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). It requires that the broadcaster furnish full
and fair coverage of important public issues, and was implicitly approved by Congress
in the 1959 amendments to § 315 of the Communications Act. 73 Stat. 557, amending
47 U.S.C. § 315(a). See notes 18-23 supra and accompanying text.
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lumbia Circuit reversed, 70 holding, first, that sufficient state action existed and,
second, that an absolute ban on public issue advertisements violated the
public's first amendment right to be informed, at least when other types of
advertisements are accepted. 71 The majority did not direct the broadcasters
to sell commercial time to the BEM or DNC, but remanded the cases to the
FCC for the determination of "reasonable procedures and regulations" to
implement this limited right of access to the media. Thereafter, the FCC
began to investigate how to implement this new policy, 72 but the Supreme
Court accepted the joint appeal of the FCC, CBS, ABC, and Post-Newsweek
stations and reversed the court of appeals.
1I a 7-2 vote with six separate opinions, the Court concluded that
neither the first amendment nor the Communications Act mandated that
broadcasters accept advertorials. The Columbia Broadcasting holding went
"to the heart of our system of broadcasting, '73 and the complexity of the
subject matter was exemplified in the divergent rationales expressed by the
individual Justices. Although the central theme of the majority was
clearly that a licensee had substantial "journalistic discretion," a close ex-
amination of this denial of universal access reveals major disagreements
within the Court. The two large areas of disparity were: first, was the
government sufficiently involved in this action by private broadcasters to
invoke the requirements of the first amendment; and, secondly, is a complete
denial of access to paying members of the public within the broadcaster's
discretion?
A. State Action
The state action question remains unanswered 4-only Justices Stewart and
70. 450 F.2d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Under 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1971) and
28 U.S.C. § 23432(1) (1971) the United States Court of Appeals may review F.C.C.
regulations and decisions.
71. Id. at 665.
72. Further Notice of Inquiry in Docket 19260, 33 F.C.C.2d 554, 37 Fed. Reg.
3383 (1972).
73. Democratic National Committee, 25 F.C.C.2d 216, 221 (1970), quoted in Colum-
bia Broadcasting, 412 U.S. at 99.
74. The court of appeals decision that action by a licensed broadcaster, with the
approval of the FCC, represented governmental action for purposes of the first amend-
ment presented "a novel question, and one with far-reaching implications," to the Su-
preme Court. 412 U.S. at 115. Analyzing this particular area of the diverse opinions
is made difficult, however, by the apparent confusion among the Justices concerning
exactly what the Chief Justice is discussing in the third section of his opinion. 412
U.S. at 181 n.12. It is clear that only three Justices concluded that insufficient
governmental action existed. The two dissenters, of course, strongly disagreed. Of
the remaining Court, Justice Douglas reasoned that if state action was found, the dis-
sent's logic would "inexorably follow;" and significantly, Justice Stewart's arguments
"closely approached" those of Justice Douglas. 412 U.S. at 150, 132. Justice White
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Rehnquist agreed with the Chief Justice that the broadcasting industry is
neither a government "proxy" nor engaged in a "symbiotic relationship"
with the government.75 In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger
asserted that no general formula could be utilized to delineate private con-
duct from state action, and analogies to other contexts were inadequate.
Stressing the difficulty of balancing the competing interests involved in ac-
cess cases, the Chief Justice surveyed the legislative history of the Com-
munications Act and concluded that Congress sought to grant a traditional
journalistic role to broadcasters, with the FCC simply overseeing their per-
formance within the general regulatory standards. Also, the opinion indi-
cated that the complex problems involved in regulating the dynamic broad-
casting industry required that the FCC be allowed great flexibility in its
rulings. In his view, the congressional objective of providing wide opera-
tional latitude for both the FCC and the broadcasters would be frustrated
by a holding that equated independent licensee conduct with government
conduct, which would subject them to the rigid restraints of the first amend-
ment.
76
The Chief Justice attempted to distinguish an analogous case urged by
the respondents, Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak.77 There the Court
had invoked first amendment restraints when a federal agency approved
the playing of radio music within a public transit bus. Chief Justice Burger
reasoned that the two cases were clearly dissimilar because the regulation
of broadcasting is not as pervasive as the regulation of public transportation
in Pollak. Furthermore, Congress has particularly indicated in the Coin-
also hinted that he found the state action argument appealing. It is obvious, then,
under slightly different circumstances, such as the FCC actually promulgating or enforc-
ing a regulation rather than merely permitting a pre-existing private policy of the
broadcasters themselves, radio and television licensees may be held to be agencies of
the government.
75. 412 U.S. at 119.
76. Similarly, Justice Stewart found the state action issue too complex for simple
analogies to other situations where governmental action had been ascertained. While
admitting in his concurrence that the FCC does comprehensively regulate broad-
casting, and even programming content to some extent, he contended that the
industry still retains first amendment protection. This protection includes the
right to select who will have access to an assigned frequency, as long as the stat-
utory obligations to the public are fulfilled. Justice Douglas, however, contrasted the
instant case with a similar situation in which a broadcaster's action would assuredly
be state action. Under his theory, if the BEM and the DNC had appealed to the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting, an agency established by Congress, when they
sought to air their advertorials, the CPB could not have refused. This is consistent
with his contention that "activities of licensees of the government operating in the
public domain are governmental actions," but his has never been a majority viewpoint.
If it were, however, Justice Douglas postulated that all broadcasters would be obli-
gated to accept any advertorials offered, basically the same thesis expressed by Justice
Brennan in his dissent.
77. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
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munications Act that editorial decisions are reserved for the licensee and
"a more basic distinction, perhaps . . . is that Pollak was concerned with
a transportation utility that itself derived no protection from the first amend-
ment."78  Also, a~cording to the Court, finding state action in Columbia
Broadcasting would necessarily entangle the government increasingly in the
daily affairs of the electronic press. Every time a broadcaster refused to
grant access to someone, for whatever reason, a constitutional conflict
would arise-a conflict subject to review by the FCC and the courts.
The dissent began in agreement with the Court that any attempt to dis-
cover sufficient state action could not depend on a "formalistic 'private-
public' dichotomy but, rather [must depend] upon more functional con-
siderations."79  There the agreement ended, however, for the dissenting
Justices Brennan and Marshall found indications of governmental involve-
ment which led them to an opposite result.8 0 In broadcasting, Congress
has established a complicated regulatory scheme governing all aspects of
the industry, and most importantly, the FCC had specifically authorized the
ban on advertorials which instigated the instant litigation. In a related mat-
ter, the dissent disagreed substantially with the Court's discernment of the
analogous Pollak holding. Pollak involved federal agency approval of the
activities of an autonomous, privately owned bus company; thus it repre-
sented precedent for finding state action in Columbia Broadcasting, at least
from the dissent's standpoint. Quoting from the earlier decision, Justice
Brennan concluded that in Columbia Broadcasting, as in Pollak, the requisite
governmental action was present based "upon the fact that [the] agency,
pursuant to protests against the [challenged policy], ordered an investigation
of it and, after formal public hearings, ordered its investigation dismissed
on the ground that the public safety, comfort and convenience were not
impaired thereby." 8'
B. The Public Interest and The First Amendment
Although the governmental action question remains largely unresolved, a
substantial majority of the Justices held that no universal right of access
springs from either the public interest requirement of the Communications
Act or from the substance of the first amendment.8 2 The only clear prece-
dent is Red Lion in which Justice White reasoned that the interests of the
broadcasters were secondary to the interests of the public. The Court did
78. 412 U.S. at 120.
79. Id. at 172.
80. Id. at 172-181.
81. 343 U.S. at 462 quoted in Columbia Broadcasting, 412 U.S. at 180.
82. 412 U.S. at 121-132.
1973]
Catholic University Law Review
not quarrel with this fundamental principle in Columbia Broadcasting, but
deduced that any balancing must be done "within the framework of the
regulatory scheme" enacted and periodically modified by Congress, with
due deference to the decisions of the FCC and the courts. In its analysis of
the legislative history of the Communications Act, the Court emphasized
that Congress had consistently rejected all efforts to impose common carrier
status on broadcasters. Such a requirement would have compelled each
broadcast station to provide access to its facilities on a nonselective basis,
similar to a telephone or telegraph. This refusal by Congress to make
broadcasting a common carrier, plus the prohibition on governmental cen-
sorship included in the Communications Act itself, 83 evidenced to the
Court a congressional intent to permit private journalistic decisions on pro-
gram content.s4
Moreover, the Court reasoned that the FCC had evolved the fairness
doctrine as a method of keeping the public informed, thus it had become
essentially a substitute for universal access. The restricted electronic spec-
trum made some selection technique imperative, and the Court held that the
FCC did not err in allowing that selection to be made by the licensee, as
long as the public interest was satisfied. Dismissing in a footnote the FCC
ruling in United Broadcasting, the Court found the language relied upon
by the court of appeals, respondents, and the dissent to be mere dictum
expressed before the fairness doctrine had fully developed.s 5 The Chief
Justice speculated that forced access would be "heavily weighted in favor
of the financially affluent," 6 and would remove the responsibility for pro-
gramming from the broadcaster who is held accountable at license renewal
time. Also, in an argument that paralleled his conclusion in the state action
section of his opinion, he declared that even a statutory right of access s7
would necessitate increasing FCC involvement in broadcast programming
to assure equitable distribution of access among the public.
Justice Douglas' opinion, concurring in the result but for "quite different
reasons," reflected his belief that during recent years the press had had its
duties and privileges clarified, if not circumscribed, by the government
83. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1971).
84. 412 U.S. at 109-110.
85. Id. at 113 n.11. Intervenor Post-Newsweek Stations distinguished United
Broadcasting as "an eccentric departure from an otherwise uniform line of Commission
pronouncements." Brief for Petitioner at 37 n.36, CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94 (1973).
86. 412 U.S. at 123.
87. See 450 F.2d at 649, where the lower federal court stated that, "whether our
decision is styled as a 'First Amendment decision' or as a decision interpreting fairness
and public interest requirements 'in light of the First Amendment' matters little."
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generally and the courts in particular. 8  Lamenting these inroads into the
freedom of the press, he postulated that the federal action sought by the
respondents would be yet another abridgement of the first amendment.
Forced access would represent one more bureaucratic burden on the broad-
casters, a burden inconsistent with radio and television's right to the same
freedom from governmental hindrance as the print media. Espousing the
"romantic"89 view of the first amendment, the Justice agreed that private
censorship exists, but responded that for every censor there is someone else
who will publish.90 Like Justice Stewart, he would "leave the press to its
devices" whenever editorial decisions are necessary. 91
Conversely, the dissent stressed the absolute nature of the ban on adver-
torials approved by the FCC, and the limited right of access requested by
the DNC and BEM.9 2 Applying a balancing test, the dissenting Justices
determined that the public's right to be informed outweighed the electronic
journalist's "absolute" privilege to reject all controversial commercials. The
fairness doctrine, relied upon by the majority to provide full presentation
of public issues, actually fails to provide any access at all, according to
the dissent, because the broadcaster selects the issues, the mode of expres-
sion and who shall speak. Rejecting the analogy to the print media, Justice
Brennan asserted that broadcasting, unlike newspapers, will deliberately
avoid as much controversy as possible, fearing that such controversy may
inhibit the profits gained from standard product advertising.93 In addition,
declared the dissent, although a long line of cases has emphasized that ef-
fective self expression sometimes demands a certain forum,94 this exclusion-
ary policy virtually closes to the vast majority of the public the most perva-
sive marketplace of ideas ever devised. In conclusion, the dissent labeled
the Court's specter of administrative apocalypse, being an inevitable result of
access, as "mere speculation" and offered some possible solutions to the
problem.9 5
88. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Branz-
burg v. Hays, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410
U.S. 73 (1973).
89. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
90. 412 U.S. at 153.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 170.
93. "Stated simply, angry customers are not good customers and, in the commercial
world of mass communications, it is simply 'bad business' to espouse-or even to allow
others to espouse-the heterodox or the controversial." 412 U.S. at 187. See also
Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and
Access, 85 HAxv. L. REV. 768, 773 n.26 (1972).
94. Cf. Logan Valley, 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
95. Specifically, Justice Brennan offered four articles which include proposed solu-
tions to the problems of access implementation. See e.g., Canby, The First Amend-
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IV. Implications For The Press And Public
A. The Impact on the Fairness Doctrine
Columbia Broadcasting's effect of frustrating the quest for access through
the purchase of time will be felt most directly by the FCC in its enforcement
of the fairness doctrine. As access seekers will probably now utilize the
fairness doctrine as an opening to the media, it would be useful to discover
whether the regulatory history of the fairness doctrine or the Columbia Broad-
casting decision itself supports an extension of the doctrine into ads which
raise controversial questions.
When a commercial message advocates one side of an important and gen-
erally recognized public issue, then the acceptance by the licensee of such
an advertisement activates the fairness doctrine. Thus, the FCC has been
willing to impose the obligation of letting the opposition be heard, when, for
instance, Humble Oil's "institutional" advertisements extolled the virtues of
the controversial Alaska oil pipeline. 6 When advertisers advocate social
values in their routine product advertisements 97 the fairness problem be-
comes more subtle. Before the FCC grants a right to reply, it must decide
whether an issue of public importance has been raised implicitly by the mes-
sage and whether the other side of such an issue has been fairly presented
in the station's overall programming.
The first case in which courts applied the fairness doctrine to commercial
advertising was Banzhaf v. FCC.9 8  The petitioner contended that because
cigarette commercials "deliberately seek to create the impression and pre-
sent the point of view that smoking is socially acceptable and desirable,
manly, and a necessary part of a rich full life,"99 the advertisers had
raised a controverisal issue with respect to the health hazards of smoking.
The FCC100 and the court of appeals agreed with this contention, and re-
quired licensees to produce at their own cost anti-smoking commercials to
be broadcast at regular intervals.10' The FCC stated that cigarette ad-
ment Right to Persuade: Access to Radio and Television, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 723,
754-57 (1972).
96. Wilderness Society and Friends of the Earth, 30 F.C.C.2d 643 (1971). Other
situations where the Commission saw a clear need to apply the fairness doctrine to
particular advertisements were when a local community chest made an appeal for funds
during an organizational controversy, United People, 32 F.C.C.2d 124 (1971); and
when a department store's ad explained its view of an employee strike, Retail Store
Employees Local 880 v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
97. See 60 Gao. L.J. at 966-68 for discussion of "social messages through commer-
cial speech-cultural spillover."
98. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
99. Id. at 1086.
100. WCBS, 8 F.C.C.2d 381, affd on reh'g, Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine
to Cigarette Advertising, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967).
101. 450 F.2d at 1097
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vertising was a unique situation, and that an extension of the ruling to
other products would be rare, if ever.-0 2
Abiding by that previous declaration, the FCC refused to apply the fair-
ness doctrine to counter advertisements against high-powered automobiles
and high octane gasoline in a later case, Friends of the Earth v. FCC.103
The Court of Appeals for District of Columbia reversed the FCC, finding
the case "indistinguishable from Banzhaf in the reach of the fairness doc-
trine,"'01 4 but affirmed the FCC's determination in Green v. FCC105 that
the extensive television advertising campaign aimed at bolstering enlistment
in the country's armed forces did not raise a sufficiently controversial is-
sue.
The majority opinion in Columbia Broadcasting certainly supports the
prior FCC determination that the fairness doctrine is directly applicable to
product advertising. Interestingly, the Court is willing to follow the lead of
Congress'0 6 in adopting the fairness doctrine as a substitute for an open ac-
cess system of broadcasting, thus placing a great burden on this statutory
method of access. It could be argued, then, that this emphasis on the doc-
trine to protect the constitutional rights of the public will encourage the
FCC to examine more closely the licensee's performance under the fairness
mandate. Of course, the impact of this inclination is diminished by the
Court's statement that increased governmental involvement in the private
actions of broadcasters should be avoided where possible. Considering
this opposing rationale, perhaps the content control practiced by the FCC
in commanding licensees to air counter-commercials will not be extended
past the Banzhaf holding. Realistically, although the Columbia Broad-
casting Court's endorsement of a licensee's obligation to provide a forum
for partisan voices under the aegis of the fairness doctrine' 0 7 could become a
basis for license renewal challenges, little likelihood exists that the FCC
102. It is significant that in this case neither the FCC nor the court of appeals
left the manner in which the health hazards of cigarette smoking were communicated
to the broadcaster's "journalistic discretion." The Commission stated, "We believe that
the frequency of the presentation of the one side and the nature of the potential haz-
ard to the public here necessitates presentation of the opposing viewpoint on a regular
basis...." 9 F.C.C.2d at 941.
103. Friends of the Earth, 24 F.C.C.2d 743 (1970), rev'd 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
105. Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971), aff'g 24 F.C.C.2d 171 (1970).
Cf. Alan F. Neckritz, 24 F.C.C.2d 175 (1070), affd 446 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1971);
San Francisco Women for Peace, 24 F.C.C.2d 156 (1970).
106. 412 U.S. at 122-23.
107. See 412 U.S. at 130 where Chief Justice Burger asserted "We reject the sugges-
tion the Fairness Doctrine permits broadcasters to preside over a 'paternalistic' re-
gime." He also approved the Commission's holding that a licensee is forbidden from
"excluding partisan voices and always itself presenting views in a bland inoffensive
manner. . ." at the risk of losing his license. Id,
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will feel compelled to deny licenses or to force broadcasters to give adver-
tising reply time. The FCC has never denied renewal of a license solely
on the basis of a fairness complaint, 0 8 and only in the cigarette ruling has
it recommended that controversial product commercials be balanced by
counter-commercials.
The extension of the fairness doctrine to cigarette advertising has been
praised by even the harshest critics of access. 109 But on grounds on policy, 110
they are content to have the trend stop there. The commentators lament
the time consuming case-by-case review, while the broadcasting representa-
tives claim that an expansion of the doctrine would cause severe economic
hardships within the industry. These economic and administrative argu-
ments parallel the FCC's approach, but are not persuasive. First, economic
collapse of the communications industry appears unlikely in light of the
health of the television advertising market,"' even after experiencing the
annual loss of $300 million' 1 2 when cigarette advertising was banned from
the air." 3 Secondly, although case-by-case review is time consuming, the
FCC has already rejected the argument that administrative review should
be abandoned.1 4  The difficulty, then, is not in the review itself, but in the
standard to be applied.
108. A 1969 case, however, WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969), indicates that
in the renewal of licenses the FCC may examine fairness doctrine complaints
concerning program content and controversial issues. Essentially, the issue in WHDH
was cross-media ownership, but the denial was also based on failure to present issues
of public importance-a factor which may again prove significant in future renewal ap-
plications. In New York, for example, an independent group, Forum Communications,
challenged the renewal of WPIX's license on the grounds that the station had not
fulfilled its obligation to fully and fairly report news events. After renewing WPIX's
license, the FCC reversed itself and ordered a full scale investigation. N.Y. Times,
June 19, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
109. Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections On Fairness
and Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe].
110. Jaffe admits that, "The Commission refused to follow the cigarette decision
on grounds not of logic but of general policy." Id. at 777.
111. "The television industry, bouncing back strong after the loss of cigarette adver-
tising in 1971, showed a 41.9 percent increase in profits last year (1972) ...
Advertising expenditures for all television came to $3.63 billion [in 1972], up 14.3
percent from 1971." The Washington Post, Aug. 22, 1973 § c, at 10.
112. This figure constituted almost 7% of all major TV network advertising
revenue in 1967.
113. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970), upheld
in Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971).
114. See 9 F.C.C. at 942-43 where the Commission rejects the broadcaster's conten-
tion that giving fairness remedies to cigarette commercials will produce complaints con-
cerning the "public issue" inherent in the advertisement of the following products:
automobiles, food with high cholesterol count, alcoholic beverages, flouride in tooth-
paste, pesticide residue in food, aspirin, detergents, candy, gum, soft drinks, girdles
and even table salt.
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One noted author has suggested this criteria: "[If a reading of the adver-
tisement reveals an intent to address, even though implicitly, a current con-
troversy, then the broadcaster can forecast the applicability of the fairness
doctrine." 115 This will affect no real change because the problem of defin-
ing "intent," "current controversy," and "address . . . implicitly" will con-
tinue to require review by the FCC and possibly the courts. An admittedly
less precise but more equitable approach is simply the general standard of
reasonableness under the circumstances."" This standard would at least
mute the claim that every advertisement raises some controversial issue,
such as the merit of consumerism or capitalism. The vagueness of the stand-
ard is its merit, for perhaps the flexibility allowed the FCC and the industry
would ameliorate the economic and administrative burden entailed in ex-
tending the fairness doctrine to controversial product information.
B. The Prerogatives of Journalistic Discretion.
The Columbia Broadcasting decision has uplifted "journalistic discretion,"
a repeated phrase in the opinion of the Court,1 7 from its obscurity as a
limitation on the government's method of enforcing prescribed public regu-
lations'" to the prominent level of a broadcaster's constitutional right. This
power to make editorial judgments represents a seldom challenged preroga-
tive, but the Court's ratification of such activity without specific limits on
the exercise of such power leaves several disturbing implications. First,
in Columbia Broadcasting, a system of "private broadcast journalism held
only broadly accountable to public interest standards""19 was held to be
consistent with public ownership of the airwaves 120 even when "journalistic
judgment of priorities and newsworthiness"'121 effectively denied members
of the public the opportunity to use the media. Certainly the limited nature
of the medium justifies the basic principle that "no private individual or
group has a right to command the use of broadcast facilities.' 22  Accord-
115. Jaffe 778 n.128.
116. Suggested in Note, Fairness Doctrine: Television as a Marketplace of Ideas,
45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1222 (1970).
117. Chief Justice Burger uses different terms to express the concept 16 times in
his opinion, using such phrases as; "broad journalistic discretion"; "editorial judgment";
"journalistic freedom"; and "journalistic judgment of priorities."
118. See Editorializing Report, notes 18-23 supra and accompanying text, where this
discretionary power was given to the broadcasters, seemingly as a concession, to reduce
the impact of the new obligations imposed on them to cover public issues fully and
fairly.
119. 412 U.S. at 120.
120. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1971).
121. 412 U.S. at 117.
122. id. at 113, citing recent FCC rejections of individual claims for access. See
Dowie A. Crettender, 18 F.C.C.2d 499 (1969); Mrs. Margaret L. Scherbina, 21 F.C.C.2d
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ingly, this rationale would allow reasonable journalistic judgments as to the
time, manner, and total amount of citizen access allowed, but the flat ban
on any personal access approved by the Court seems inimical to meaningful
public ownership of the airwaves.
Secondly, although three Justices claimed that a licensee's "journalistic
freedom [is not] as large as that exercised by a newspaper,' 123 the re-
maining Court implicitly agreed that journalistic discretion is as much a
right of the broadcaster as it is of the newspaper editor.' 24 How much this
discretion is to be tempered by the statutory public interest requirements is
unclear, but the decision seems to provide the broadcast licensee with a
strong defense for any particular programming decision. 2 5  The Court
recognized the potential for abuse by the broadcasters, but accepted the
danger "in order to preserve higher values.' 126
The immediate impact of Columbia Broadcasting on the constitutional
right of access is clear, but the future of the concept is not. Seven members
of the Supreme Court, espousing what the proponents of access label a
narrow, romantic view of the first amendment, have firmly rejected any
right of entry to the media. For those seeking public exposure of their
ideas, the only avenues presently open are actions of sufficient magnitude
to attract the coverage of the news media. On the other hand, the Court
has assuredly granted wide discretionary power to the electronic press. This
journalistic discretion, the power to edit, is now clearly a constitutionally
protected element of the extremely valuable broadcasting license.
Roy L. Mason
Robert E. Ganz
141 (1969); Boalt Hall Student Ass'n., 20 F.C.C.2d 612 (1969); Mrs. Madalyn Murray,
40 F.C.C. 647 (1965); Democratic State Central Committee of California, 19 F.C.C.2d
833 (1968). But see United Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945).
123. 412 U.S. at 117-18.
124. The Chief Justice readily accepted the network's proposition that the BEM "ad-
vertorials" were rejected because the broadcasters felt 10- to 60-second spot announce-
ments were "ill-suited to intelligible and intelligent treatment of public issues." 412
U.S. at 118. However, he failed to notice CBS's admission in their brief that the
1970 CBS network news program devoted less than four minutes an evening to coverage
of the Vietnam war and the related domestic protests. Brief for Petitioner at 7, n.10,
and App. 81-343, CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
125. A recent example of an incident in which a commercial broadcaster might
cite Columbia Broadcasting as support for his journalistic judgment concerned the CBS
network television program, The Selling o1 the Pentagon. The prograam became the
subject of considerable controversy when certain editing practices were thought to re-
flect a journalistic bias. The network was requested by investigating United States
Senators to submit the edited portions of the program for examination. The network
producers refused, contending that such acts were within their rights as journalists.
126. 412 U.S. at 125.
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